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Medicare reform is a critical issue for the public agenda. The most promising 
option for addressing Medicare reform 
is competitive bidding—using health 
plans’ bids to determine the government’s 
contribution to a basic set of benefits in 
every market area. 
Competitive bidding proposals have a 
long history in Medicare.1 Competitive 
bidding brings market pricing to Medicare, 
but providers have resisted this system 
for decades. What is different now, and 
what makes competitive bidding a realistic 
alternative for discussion, is that Medicare 
reform is an urgent matter and competitive 
bidding is a tested means for changing 
the financial prospects of the program. 
Competitive bidding is not the only 
necessary Medicare reform, but it is an 
essential component.
We begin this paper with a review of the 
history of competitive bidding in Medicare. 
Then we move to a definition of terms, which 
is crucial in any discussion of competitive 
pricing because the often-heated public 
debate around these issues frequently distorts 
positions and confuses issues by conflating 
different terms and making some arguments 
appear other than they are. Following this 
terminological exercise, we move to a series 
of sections discussing competitive bidding 
in Medicare, with special focus on the 
challenges to introducing it.
In the course of this discussion, we 
show that competitive bidding has been 
extensively tested in Medicare applications. 
It should be relatively easy to implement 
because so many steps required of the 
Medicare program already are in effect 
without notable problems. And it is 
amenable to political consensus because 
it allows decisions on key parameters to 
accommodate widely different political 
judgments. Put differently, competitive 
bidding is not a right-wing or left-wing 
approach. It can be adapted to choices all 
along the political spectrum and still bring 
at least some benefits of market pricing to 
the Medicare program.
HISTORY OF PRIVATE PLANS 
AND COMPETITIVE BIDDING  
IN MEDICARE
At a minimum, competitive bidding 
requires bidders: multiple, identifiable 
“health plans” that are able and willing to 
submit bids to provide some defined health 
care benefit. We will define these terms 
with greater precision in due course. For 
now, it is worth considering the history  
of their use. 
Nothing about private health plans in the 
Medicare program is new. Private plans 
have been offered to Medicare beneficiaries 
since its inception in 1965.2 
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Nor is anything new about proposals that 
use competitive bidding. Ralph Saul of the 
Insurance Company of North America 
(INA) first proposed a fixed government 
contribution to Medicare premiums based on 
health plans’ bids in 1979.3 Walter McClure 
made a similar proposal in 1982, followed 
by Alain Enthoven in 1988.4 Researchers 
at the University of Minnesota developed a 
detailed competitive bidding proposal for the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(CMS), then the Health Care Financing 
Administration (HCFA), in the late 1980s 
and later assisted CMS in attempts to 
demonstrate competitive bidding in four US 
cities during the Clinton administration.5
Years later, we showed that competitive 
bidding had been attempted almost 
constantly since the program’s founding 
for many different parts of the Medicare 
benefit—including Medicare health 
maintenance organizations (HMOs) for 
Part A and B benefits; prescription drug 
plans for Part D benefits; and particular 
elements of coverage such as durable 
medical equipment (DME), clinical 
laboratory services, and coronary artery 
bypass grafts.6 Bidding designs were 
employed in these efforts, and in all of 
them, competitive bidding proved to be 
practical and (when bids were received) 
more economical than the standard pricing 
arrangements of the traditional Medicare 
program. However, almost all of these 
efforts were unsuccessful, largely because of 
the politics of Medicare or judges acting at 
opponents’ behest to block the programs. 
In this paper, we focus not on a particular 
service like DME but on the whole of the 
traditional, nondrug Medicare entitlement 
benefit and how health plans realistically can 
bid on that benefit. The bidders we envision 
include Medicare Advantage plans such as 
HMOs, preferred provider organizations 
(PPOs), and other private plans but also 
include the traditional fee-for-service (FFS) 
Medicare program. We will refer to the 
traditional program as the “government 
plan” in the discussion that follows. 
We will not include Part D drug coverage 
in the bidding model we discuss because 
of special statutory constraints in this area 
and complexities of drugs and Part D that 
require separate discussion. 
Our discussion focuses on plans eligible 
to enroll the core population of aged and 
disabled beneficiaries in Medicare for the 
basic entitlement benefit. We exclude plans 
that enroll beneficiaries with special needs 
and special care arrangements such as  
social HMOs and the Program of  
All-Inclusive Care for the Elderly, as each  
of these populations or programs raises 
special technical issues. We discuss certain 
special populations: dual eligibles and  
the Specified Low Income Medicare 
Beneficiary and Qualified Medicare 
Beneficiary subsidy programs. 
Competitive bidding is not the only necessary Medicare 
reform, but it is an essential component.
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THE NEED FOR PRECISE TERMS
Defining terms is a challenge. In this 
section, with some humility regarding the 
prospects for success, we attempt to clarify 
and insist upon certain distinctions.
Assuming the Medicare beneficiary is 
offered a choice of several different health 
plans, there are basically two ways to set  
the price of the benefit:
1. Administrative pricing determines 
the price of health coverage based on 
calculations from administrative records 
such as prior years’ health claims in the 
traditional Medicare program.
2. Competitive bidding sets the 
government contribution based on the 
bids submitted by competing health 
plans within a market area, such as a 
county. We noted:
The most glaring problem with 
[administrative pricing] … is that 
information about the costs of care 
flows in the wrong direction: from 
the organization that knows very little 
about [private plan] costs (the federal 
government) to the organizations 
that know as much as possible (the 
[private] plans). A common response 
to the problems of the current 
administrative payment system is 
some form of competitive pricing. 
Competitive pricing reverses the flow 
of cost information; that is, [private] 
plans tell the government how much it 
costs to care for Medicare beneficiaries. 
Plans submit bids under a system that 
rewards low bids and penalizes high 
bids. An important distinction between 
competitive pricing and the current 
payment system is that rewards and 
penalties are linked primarily to the 
prices submitted by plans, rather than to 
the level of benefits they provide.7 
Note that these two ways of determining 
the price of coverage do not establish any 
necessary relationship between that price 
and the government contribution to the 
premium. Under either system, government 
can contribute less than, the same amount 
as, or more than the price of a given benefit. 
However, the administrative pricing system 
cannot get the prices right in any systematic 
way. Variations in the underlying cost in 
relation to the administrative price ensure 
that the amount of government support  
also varies, likely in unsystematic ways  
since the underlying costs are not revealed 
in any reliable way in an administrative 
pricing system.
Competitive bidding requires precisely 
specifying the benefits associated with 
the government contribution because the 
competing health plans have to bid on 
something specific. An administrative 
pricing system does not require this 
specification, as the administrative 
calculations can be based on whatever 
the government chooses. In competitive 
bidding, the requirement to specify the 
benefits does not mean that the product  
on which health plans bid has to be 
identical across all plans—“actuarial 
equivalence” or some other standard 
of uniformity can be sufficient for a 
meaningful comparison of the bids. 
A second set of terms fundamentally 
important to the current debate revolves 
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around whether the government is 
purchasing a benefit or providing a 
contribution to purchase a benefit: whether 
there is a “defined benefit” or a “defined 
contribution.” 
“Defined contribution” simply means that 
the government’s contribution to premiums 
is the same across all the health plans. 
This term tells us nothing about how that 
contribution is determined or its relation 
to the cost of the benefit. Similarly, the 
term “defined benefit” often is interpreted 
to mean that the government will pay 
whatever it takes to provide the defined 
benefit; that also is misleading because this 
term tells us nothing about the different 
types of health plans that might provide the 
defined benefit or their cost of doing so. 
Competitive bidding is a defined-
contribution approach because the 
government’s contribution to premiums is 
the same whether the beneficiary chooses 
the government plan or a private plan. But 
it also is a defined-benefit approach because 
the bids submitted by the government and 
private plans are based on their cost of 
providing a defined entitlement benefit. 
The government’s contribution is set to 
fully fund (net of the Part B premium) the 
cost of the most economical plan or plans, 
leaving beneficiaries to pay only additional 
costs of more expensive options. 
In this paper, we do not use the term 
“premium support” because it is too 
vague—it refers to widely varying bidding 
models with widely varying political and 
economic consequences. We will focus on 
competitive bidding to set a benchmark 
price (for example, at the lowest or second-
lowest bid) that accomplishes two things: it 
sets the level beyond which higher bidders 
have to charge a premium and the amount 
of the government contribution based 
on the bids. In other words, competitive 
bidding is both a defined-contribution 
and defined-benefit program, in the sense 
described above.
In the model of competitive bidding we 
consider here, both the government plan 
and private health plans submit bids to 
provide the entitlement benefits to Medicare 
beneficiaries in a defined market area. The 
government’s contribution to premiums 
is based on those bids and, except for 
adjustment for enrollee risk, is the same 
regardless of the health plan the beneficiary 
chooses. If a beneficiary wishes to enroll in a 
more expensive plan (whose bid is above the 
government’s contribution), the beneficiary 
pays the added amount. This is the key to 
any market-based system: the added cost of 
more expensive options must be worthwhile 
to the beneficiary. 
The competitive bidding proposal we 
discuss in this paper is essentially identical 
to our proposal 20 years ago, with further 
detail added in two later pieces.8 That 
proposal envisioned continuation of both 
the government plan and private health 
plans and the specification of entitlement 
benefits on which all plans will bid. 
We realize that there is concern in some 
quarters that competitive bidding is a 
covert attempt to drive the government 
plan from the market or to convert the 
government’s contribution into a voucher 
that has no reference to the cost of the 
entitlement benefits.9 While acknowledging 
A Competitive Bidding Approach to Medicare Reform 6
the seriousness of the budgetary problems 
associated with entitlement benefits, any 
plain reading of our work over the past 
20 years will demonstrate our consistent 
position that both the government and 
private health plans have a legitimate role 
to play in the Medicare program and that 
rather than abandoning the concept of an 
entitlement benefit, competitive bidding 
requires it. 
Moreover, as we have stated repeatedly, the 
case for competitive bidding is not based 
on Medicare’s fiscal problems. We would 
recommend competitive bidding even 
if Medicare were in fine fiscal condition 
because (a) competitive bidding is the most 
reliable way to discover the health plans’ true 
cost of providing the entitlement benefits 
and (b) setting the government contribution 
to premiums at any amount greater than 
the competitively determined price of the 
entitlement benefits wastes money. 
A different way of looking at this issue is 
simply to examine the data: would the 
government plan always be the highest 
bidder? In a recent paper, the authors 
demonstrated that in fact the government 
plan would be the low bidder in counties in 
which 50 percent of beneficiaries live.10 The 
import of this analysis is that, at the outset 
of a new competitive bidding regime, the 
government plan may be in a better position 
to compete than is casually assumed.
Legitimate questions have been raised about 
whether risk adjustments can be so finely 
devised to compensate the government plan 
if it is selected by individuals with high 
risk. Without adequate risk adjustment, 
the government plan’s bid would be 
compromised, undermining the place of the 
government plan in Medicare. This could be 
an important problem, given the freedom of 
private plans to design benefits to attract low-
risk individuals and the more cumbersome, 
congressionally governed structure and 
administration of the government plan. We 
will treat issues of risk adjustment later in the 
paper. Here, it will be useful to summarize 
the types of flexibility the government plan 
might be allowed that would enhance its 
ability to compete over time.
We believe the rules of competition should 
be simple: the government plan should 
be permitted to do no more nor less than 
any other Medicare health plan, subject to 
(a) reaching a general agreement on what 
constitutes a “level playing field” between 
the government plan and private plans; and 
(b) the requirement that the government 
plan offer the entitlement benefit package to 
all beneficiaries throughout the country.
What does this mean in practice? What 
might the government plan do that it 
cannot or is not doing now? Some new 
directions the government plan might take 
include the following:11
•	 The government plan could be allowed 
to offer any supplementary benefit it 
At the outset of a new competitive bidding regime, the 
government plan may be in a better position to compete 
than is casually assumed.
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likes. The bids would be based on an 
entitlement benefit package required of 
all health plans, and beneficiaries would 
pay the marginal cost of supplementary 
benefits out of their own pockets.
•	 The government plan could be allowed 
to make cost-saving coverage decisions 
or offer additional services beyond the 
entitlement if beneficiaries are willing to 
pay for those services. 
•	 The same rules that apply to coverage 
also should apply to investments in 
administrative improvements. If a 
particular administrative initiative has a 
positive return on investment and does 
not raise other issues (such as violating 
the universal eligibility to Medicare 
benefits), then the government plan 
should be able to make such investments.
•	 The government plan could be permitted 
to offer an alternative plan that features 
selective provider contracting based on 
the price and quality of providers. 
•	 The government plan could be able to 
offer “one-stop shopping” for Part D and 
supplementary coverage. MA enrollees 
can purchase basic Medicare coverage, 
coverage of outpatient prescription 
drugs, and any supplementary coverage 
they choose from a single health plan. 
The government plan is prohibited 
from offering Part D coverage and 
supplementary insurance. We have argued 
elsewhere that this one-stop shopping 
might correct certain existing sources 
of market failure, though it would 
elicit intense political opposition over 
government negotiation of drug prices.12 
•	 In the future, the government plan could 
be allowed to pay providers any way it 
likes, including withholdings and other 
shared-savings arrangements. A form of 
this payment is already slated to begin in 
2015, under the value-based purchasing 
requirements of the Affordable Care Act. 
Future changes might be incompatible 
with the accountable care organization 
(ACO) model as we know it today. The 
compatibility of innovations in the 
government plan with ACOs and other 
initiatives is not very important, in our 
opinion, as long as the innovations do 
not introduce extraordinary obstacles  
to our main goal, establishing 
competitive bidding. 
This is just a tentative list. The important 
point is that the government plan should 
be given greater freedom to compete in 
an equitable way with private plans and 
that may require rethinking parts of the 
government plan. 
If these possibilities would allow the 
government plan to compete better with 
private plans, a number of considerations 
would cut the other way: burdens borne 
by private plans that the government plan 
avoids. The first is the requirement that 
private plans report Healthcare Effectiveness 
Data and Information Set quality-of-care 
measures. The second is the requirement 
that private plans provide adequate access 
to providers throughout their service areas. 
The government plan is not subject to either 
requirement. If Congress believes that both 
requirements are legitimate qualifications 
for any health plan to participate in the 
Medicare program, it should impose them to 
an equal degree on the government plan.13
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THE BIDDING MODEL
With the understanding of the background, 
purposes, and terminology of competitive 
bidding we have outlined, the question 
becomes: how can it be done? In the 
sections that follow, we summarize a 
practical bidding model and certain 
technical issues that competitive bidding 
raises. The main elements of the bidding 
model are:
•	 Eligibility and participation of 
plans. As it does now, CMS would 
require that private plans report high-
quality measures and meet minimum 
levels of quality before allowing them 
to participate in Medicare. Given 
certain issues of plan behavior and risk 
adjustment that we discuss, we believe 
private plans should provide more 
complete information about the cost and 
utilization of each enrollee.
•	 Benefit package. Congress would 
determine a national entitlement benefit 
package (for example, the current 
benefits). 
•	 Structure and conduct of the bidding 
process. All health plans would submit 
bids on the entitlement benefits for a 
standardized enrollee in each payment 
area. The government plan’s bid would 
be the average fee-for-service cost of a 
standardized enrollee in each payment 
area. Private plans would choose their 
service areas; the government plan would 
serve all areas. Initially, the payment 
areas would be counties, as at present.
•	 Adjustments to bids. To permit 
equitable comparison of bids—a “level 
playing field”—the full cost of the 
government plan must be allocated  
to its bid.
•	 Determination of government 
payments from the bids. The 
government premium contribution for 
all plans, including the government plan, 
would be set as a function of the risk-
adjusted bids of the qualified health plans 
able to enroll some minimum proportion 
of the beneficiaries in the local area 
(plans able to serve only marginal 
numbers of enrollees would not set the 
contribution). We prefer the government 
to set its premium contribution at the 
lowest or second-lowest risk-adjusted  
bid of a qualified plan, subject to  
capacity limits. 
It is worth emphasizing again that this 
bidding model does not contain a cap 
on the government contribution to what 
beneficiaries pay. The model is designed to 
get the price of the entitlement right and to 
ensure that beneficiaries have at least one 
option available at no charge over the Part B 
premium. It does not address the question 
of whether the government can afford the 
current entitlement or the question of what 
entitlement the government can afford. 
Those are important but different questions 
for Medicare reform. We do not attempt to 
answer them here. 
However, the answer we do provide to 
the question we do ask is also crucial 
for Medicare reform. Simply put, the 
government is paying too much for the 
entitlement benefit. Once we know what 
that benefit costs, we can better address the 
larger fiscal issues. 
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The short message of our paper is actually 
encouraging: competitive bidding requires 
little extension of administrative practices 
already in place—it is a major change in 
policy tied to a tractable, evolutionary 
change in administrative practices. We can 
have a reasonable discussion about buffering 
the abruptness of any changes competitive 
bidding brings, but the methods for this 
are administratively simple. Certain key 
technical issues, notably risk adjustment, 
require new thinking, but the advent of 
competitive bidding can expedite workable 
solutions, given the availability of more 
detailed, beneficiary-level information.
Qualifying Plans to Bid. The first step in 
any bidding model is determining who can 
bid. This is straightforward for competitive 
bidding because CMS already qualifies 
private plans in a process that is more 
extensive than provider qualification in the 
government plan. 
Arguments exist for using the bidding 
platform to make quality more transparent 
under competitive bidding. We noted in a 
recent article that establishing additional 
qualification requirements for bidders 
(such as enhanced accreditation as a 
condition of bidding) and additional data 
requirements (such as enhanced monitoring 
of quality and access) may be desirable.14 
The nationwide competitive bidding 
program for durable medical equipment 
included such enhancements. Through 
bidder qualification and closer oversight, 
competitive pricing could bring scrutiny to 
areas of the Medicare benefit that currently 
get only cursory review.
The Payment Area. A key parameter in 
any bidding system is the geographic area 
for which a plan submits a bid to provide 
coverage. The geographic areas relevant to 
competitive bidding have two components: 
the “payment” area formally established for 
the activity being bid and the health plan’s 
“service” area. A payment or bidding area is 
the area in which beneficiaries choose among 
competing health plans at a fixed government 
premium contribution. A “service area” is 
the geographic area over which a health plan 
can market its product to beneficiaries. Plans 
typically choose multiple payment areas to 
comprise their service area.
In the current MA program, the bidding 
area is the county, as it has been since the 
early years of private plan participation in 
the program. Private plans are familiar with 
that system, and the average cost of caring for 
beneficiaries in the government plan already is 
calculated at the county level. Administrative 
and information systems, as well as plans’ 
estimates of risk and other bid attributes, 
are well established at the county level. If 
competitive bidding were implemented, it 
would make sense in terms of administrative 
ease and the extent of change attempted 
in the first steps of a bidding program to 
continue using the familiar county bidding 
units, at least for a transition period.
Simply put, the government is paying too much  
for the entitlement benefit.
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But the disadvantages of county-level 
payment areas have long been noted. 
Counties can be extraordinarily diverse. 
Moreover, counties have no necessary 
relationship to the number or type of health 
plans offered or beneficiaries’ access to those 
plans. Welch noted that the county-based 
payment system is complex and inaccurate 
and incorporates the effect of high HMO 
market penetration on FFS costs.15 He 
suggested payment areas consisting of 
urban cores versus suburban rings to bring 
greater homogeneity to payment areas.16 
Rossiter and Adamache proposed setting 
metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) as the 
geographic payment area and aggregating 
all non-MSA counties into a single rural 
payment area.17
Because competitive bidding relies on 
competition among health plans to set the 
government’s contribution to premiums, 
the geographic payment area should be 
set with an eye to maintaining a healthy 
degree of competition among the health 
plans serving beneficiaries in that area—
keeping in mind that private plans can 
select which areas they will enter. Pizer 
and Frakt showed that counties with more 
competing MA plans had lower average 
out-of-pocket premiums, independent of 
benefits offered.18 They also found that 
plans in more competitive counties offered 
more generous supplementary benefits, 
controlling for the level of the government 
payment. Feldman and colleagues 
showed that price competition increases 
significantly when health plans are of the 
same type—for example, plans with broad 
provider networks.19 Thus, a payment area 
ideally should contain several health plans 
of the same type. Beneficiaries’ access to 
competing plans also is important. Good 
transportation networks could justify a 
larger payment area. 
In 2012, only 0.3 percent of Medicare 
beneficiaries lacked access to a Medicare 
Advantage plan (the most common type of 
private plan), and on average, beneficiaries 
could choose from 12 different MA plans in 
their market area. Eighty-eight percent of 
beneficiaries have access to an MA plan that 
offers Part D drug coverage at no additional 
premium beyond the Part B premium.20 
Thus, indications exist that competition in 
a bidding system would be robust, although 
we do not know how private plans would 
change their service areas in a competitive 
bidding regime after payment levels are 
reduced by the bidding.
MA plans are required to define their 
service area (the geographic area in which 
they are able to establish provider networks 
to care for their enrollees). The government 
plan is offered to all beneficiaries in all 
areas, but it is not required to guarantee 
that beneficiaries can find a provider who is 
willing to treat them.
Although it would be foolish to force a 
private plan to expand its service area to 
places where it is unable to establish provider 
networks, regional PPOs have agreed to 
cover beneficiaries in at least 1 of 26 regions 
established by CMS.21 Currently, regional 
plans are available to 76 percent of Medicare 
beneficiaries.22 Again, however, plans’ 
willingness to bid by regions is related to 
the high levels of payment such plans have 
enjoyed, something unlikely to continue 
under competitive bidding.
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Private plans’ ability to choose their 
service (and thus payment) areas raises 
the possibility that they might attempt to 
collude on market entry and thus segment 
the market, gaining market pricing power. 
There are several responses to this concern. 
First, virtually all Medicare beneficiaries 
have access to a private plan; on average, 
beneficiaries can choose from 12 MA 
plans.23 Second, even if private plans were 
reluctant to enter a market area, that does 
not necessarily imply that beneficiaries or 
taxpayers are worse off. The government 
plan is universally available, and if private 
plans do not feel they can offer a competitive 
product in a market area, beneficiaries still 
have access to the government plan at the 
Part B premium.24 Third, the price of the 
government plan always checks any attempt 
at collusion by private plans. 
In our view, the serious concern about 
collusion is that private plans might 
together “shadow price” the government 
plan’s premium in areas where that 
premium is high, rather than submitting a 
bid that reflects their true cost. Although 
this may be a serious antitrust concern, 
it should not be a barrier to competitive 
bidding in Medicare. Currently, market 
concentration among physicians and 
hospitals appears to be a greater problem 
than concentration of health plans.25
Thus, we envision a bidding system that 
begins by using county-level payment areas, 
then through research and monitoring 
considers larger payment areas and tracks 
whether plan behavior suggests notable 
gaming that undermines the purposes of 
the bidding system. 
One key to developing the bidding system 
will be the risk adjustment system that is 
used. We consider that in the next section. 
Risk Adjustment. Concerns about risk 
selection in competitive bidding systems 
generally are driven by the desire to have 
the relative prices of competing health plans 
reflect only differences in efficiency, not 
differences in the health risk of the plans’ 
enrollees. These concerns are present for 
risk adjustment in any pricing system, not 
only competitive bidding. Although that 
desire has considerable appeal, it should 
not be left unexamined. The prices of many 
products reflect the characteristics and 
consumption habits of the people who buy 
them (for example, safe-driver discounts 
on automobile insurance). The assumption 
underlying the desire for risk adjustment 
appears to be that a beneficiary’s health risk 
is “exogenous” to both the beneficiary and 
health plan, and thus it is not fair to hold 
either the beneficiary or the health plan 
responsible for costs associated with higher 
health risks. Another concern is that if the 
differences in health risk among competing 
plans are uncompensated, plans will shun 
high risks by discouraging their enrollment 
or encouraging their disenrollment in overt 
and covert ways.
The most important point about risk 
adjustment is that CMS already has an 
elaborate system for it that represents the 
culmination of years of work and several 
increasingly sophisticated iterations. CMS 
uses the hierarchical condition category 
(HCC) risk adjustment system that 
captures many different health conditions. 
One of those risk categories is arbitrarily 
given the weight 1.0. Lower-risk categories 
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have weights less than 1.0, and higher-risk 
categories have weights greater than 1.0. If 
the payment rate for a 1.0 enrollee is $700 
per month and the weight for a particular 
beneficiary is 1.1, then the health plan 
receives $770 a month for that enrollee. 
Currently, the weights are derived from 
the cost of caring for beneficiaries in the 
government plan.
Suppose that private plans enroll beneficiaries 
who are healthier than beneficiaries 
choosing the government plan and some 
of those differences are not captured by 
the risk adjustment system. As a result, the 
government overpays private plans. That 
is what happened with the government’s 
original rudimentary risk adjustment 
system—the adjusted average per capita 
cost. Over the years, the government has 
refined its risk adjustment system to improve 
the accuracy of payments to private plans. 
However, the Government Accountability 
Office recently reported that payments 
under the current HCC risk adjustment 
system may be affected by the propensity 
of private plans to code more complete 
diagnostic information than is typical in 
the government plan—not surprising since 
the private plans’ payments depend on their 
coding, while the government plan is under 
no such incentive.26 
How would uncompensated risk 
differentials affect a competitive bidding 
system? In a competitive bidding system, all 
plans bid for the 1.0 enrollee. Suppose that 
private plans enjoy favorable risk selection 
that is not captured by the HCC risk 
adjusters. Thus, the 1.0 enrollee in a private 
health plan really is, say, a 0.95 enrollee. 
Competition will force plans to submit bids 
that are close to their cost, and as a result, 
private plans’ bids will be lower than the 
government plan’s bid. This is due, in part, 
to this favorable risk selection not accounted 
for in the HCC risk adjustment system. As 
a result, the premium differential between 
the government plan and the private plans, 
and thus the beneficiary’s out-of-pocket 
premiums, will be distorted (too large).
What can be done if Medicare is truly 
unable to adjust the bids for risk selection? 
Overt attempts by private plans to recruit 
low risks are illegal, and CMS monitors 
those activities (the effectiveness of that 
monitoring is unknown). In addition, 
that annual Medicare Current Beneficiary 
Survey, which collects extensive information 
about the beneficiary’s health and functional 
status, could be used to monitor some types 
of selection that the HCC risk adjusters 
might not pick up. Additional enrollee-level 
data could be collected from health plans if 
competitive bidding were introduced.
Frakt and others have emphasized the 
limitations of available risk adjustment 
methods.27 To ensure that selection is not 
getting out of control, Frakt suggests the 
need for a “full-court press” in monitoring 
risk selection by plans that have the ability to 
rapidly adjust how they enroll beneficiaries. 
Administrative Costs. Most analysts 
understand that the optimal expenditure 
on administration is not likely to be the 
minimal level in absolute terms, on a per 
capita basis, or as a percent of total plan 
expenditures. Administrative costs can 
be minimized simply by paying every 
claim that is submitted with no scrutiny 
whatsoever. The likely result would be 
rampant fraud and abuse. An efficient 
health plan should be willing to spend a 
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dollar on administration if doing so saves 
more than a dollar. As a result, the ratio of 
administrative costs to total spending will 
rise, not fall. 
An efficient health plan acting as a 
responsible agent for its enrollees also 
would spend an additional dollar on 
administration even if it yielded no savings, 
as long as the expenditure resulted in better 
service for which enrollees were willing to 
pay at least a dollar. For example, a health 
plan might add staff to its telephone help 
lines if enrollees were willing to pay for 
those additional staff.
Thus, as with spending on services, the 
right question is not, “How much are we 
spending on administration?” but “What 
are we getting for our money?” Private 
health plan spending on administrative 
costs might be inefficiently high or low, 
and the same is true of the government 
plan. The most reliable way to answer the 
efficiency question is to put both types of 
plans to a market test. 
Proper accounting for administrative cost is 
particularly worrying to those who believe 
that the government plan’s bid might 
not reflect its full cost. To appreciate this 
concern it is important to understand that 
CMS actually has two different functions. 
The first is managing the government heath 
plan. The second is managing the system 
of competing health plans that are offered 
to beneficiaries. Enthoven called that entity 
the “sponsor” of the managed competition 
system.28 The sponsor operates at a level 
above the competing health plans. The 
concern is that CMS, in its role as sponsor, 
will give an unfair advantage to its own 
plan versus those of the private competitors, 
rather than offering both types of plans on 
a level playing field. 
Establishing a truly level playing field 
will be a difficult and ongoing task. For 
example, the Medicare website that allows 
beneficiaries to compare all the plans in 
their market area is a sponsor-level activity, 
so the cost of maintaining it should not be 
charged to the government plan. However, 
the cost of mailing marketing material 
to beneficiaries that mentions only the 
government plan should be charged to 
the government plan and included in the 
its bid. The cost of collecting the Part B 
premium is another sponsor-level activity 
because the Social Security Administration 
collects the Part B premium for both 
the government plan and private plans. 
However, the government should include 
the cost of collecting the additional 
premium in areas where a private plan  
is the low bidder in its plan bid. 
Many cost allocation decisions will be 
contentious because of spillover benefits. 
For example, detecting and prosecuting 
fraud among providers of services to the 
government plan may catch some providers 
that were defrauding private plans, and  
vice versa. 
The right question is not, “How much are we spending  
on administration?” but “What are we getting for  
our money?”
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For the playing field to be truly level, the 
government plan must be allowed to spend 
as much as it likes on administration, as 
suggested earlier. Currently, the government 
plan can pay for administrative expenses 
only from a fund earmarked by Congress 
for administration, not from the funds that 
pay for beneficiaries’ health expenses.29 
Thus, the government plan may be 
constrained from additional investment on 
administration, even when such investment 
would save money. Private plans face no 
such constraint.30
Regulating Bidders and the Problem 
of Collusion. How would competitive 
bidding work after 10–15 years in the 
field? It is important to take this longer-
run perspective because some problems 
may come up that are not addressed in our 
analysis of how to set up a bidding system. 
The problem of most concern is collusion 
among bidders. 
One solution, as noted earlier, is to make 
the bidding process and the behavior of all 
plans as transparent as possible. Another 
solution is sound design of the bidding 
process. In this regard, it is useful to 
examine a recent case of bidder collusion in 
a private bidding system. In 2009, Hewitt 
Associates conducted an Internet auction in 
which more than 50 health plans competed 
for the business of three employers—
IBM, Morgan Stanley, and Ikon Office 
Solutions.31 The auctions resulted in 
premium rates falling by 2 to 8 percent in 
an environment where annual increases in 
premiums paid by employers were running 
from 4 to 6 percent above the general rate 
of inflation. The next year, 100 health plans 
and 9 employers participated in the auction. 
But only four employers returned in 2011. 
The auctions failed to generate appreciable 
cost savings and were discontinued. 
A 2012 analysis by Gupta, Parente, and 
Sanyal suggests this auction failed because 
of two built-in design flaws.32 The first was 
that the bids were open, so all participants 
knew what the other plans were bidding. 
This is an efficient bidding system in 
“common value” auctions, where the 
value of the auctioned good is the same 
for everyone (a Rembrandt painting, 
for example). Open bids can give the 
participants information about the value of 
the painting. However, open-bid auctions 
can be a format to signal prices to other 
bidders, leading to collusion. 
The second flaw was that the winners were 
determined by the buyers on the basis of 
prices and nonprice attributes such as plan 
performance ratings. The participating 
plans did not have a clear idea of how the 
winners would be chosen, and they appear 
to have believed that their likelihood of 
winning would not increase significantly 
by lowering their bids. Even though all 
bids were disclosed, the lower-ranked plans 
rarely revised their bids. 
These are real problems, and they suggest 
that designing a bidding system that can 
survive in the long run is not trivial. But it 
is not impossible, either. Because winning 
the auction by being the lowest-priced 
health plan does not have the same value 
for every participant, the bids should be 
sealed. Equally important, participants need 
to know how the winner will be selected. 
Our advice is to make all plans meet certain 
performance standards to be qualified to 
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bid, then pick the lowest bid, period. Plans 
will know that the probability of winning 
is determined directly, and solely, by 
submitting lower bids.
The important message here is that sound 
design from the beginning is the best way 
to sustain the bidding system over time. 
The design should be supplemented by 
active monitoring and regulation as needed 
to facilitate transparency but should not rely 
on that to prevent collusion.
Consumer Information and Enrollment. 
Competitive bidding changes the terms 
under which beneficiaries make choices 
about their Medicare coverage. Beneficiaries 
who do not even feel they have made a 
choice in the past—because they have 
stayed in the traditional government plan 
or have stayed with their original choice 
for a long time—may face different prices 
for their current options. They can avoid 
any change in premium by changing plans 
under the bidding model we have outlined, 
but will they understand the need to make 
this change?
Frakt has described the problem: 
There is research [for example, analyzing 
elders’ Part D choices33] that suggests 
beneficiaries have difficulty making 
good choices among the myriad of 
available plans. Many on Medicare lack 
the cognitive ability to do the work to 
do so. Not all of them have children 
or spouses who can help. Thus, some 
suggest the right thing to do is to 
simplify Medicare, not make it more 
(or even keep it as) complex… This 
argument also relates to the feeling 
among some that private plans will take 
advantage of beneficiaries. If plans make 
obtaining care difficult in some way, 
some beneficiaries could lose access to 
necessary care. Finally, there are ways to 
help beneficiaries navigate plan choices 
and obtain the care they need. For 
example, additional resources could be 
spent on counselors available by phone 
or in the community.34
It is clear that the introduction of 
competitive bidding, even with generous 
transitional terms to buffer the abruptness 
of any effects, will make it more difficult 
for elders to understand and navigate the 
benefit successfully.
There are analogues in other Medicare 
experience, such as the introduction of Part 
D and the demonstration and rollout of 
competitive pricing for DME. Although the 
analogies are not perfect, they suggest that 
program changes do not necessarily wreak 
havoc on beneficiary choices. For example, 
in a review of the DME competitive 
bidding demonstration submitted to 
Congress, the US Department of Health 
and Human Services (2004) concluded, 
“Substantial early efforts to educate 
beneficiaries, referral agents, and suppliers 
about the demonstration helped to ease the 
transition to the competitively bid fees and 
suppliers list.”35
Sound design from the beginning is the best way to  
sustain the bidding system over time.
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These earlier experiences do not settle 
the issue, but they provide a mixture of 
caution and reassurance. Perhaps the most 
important caution is about assuming 
that elders are good at making choices in 
the current program, much less in a new 
landscape of competitive prices. But means 
exist to help beneficiaries navigate plan 
choices and enable reasonable transitions to 
the new price structure. Such efforts will be 
essential to avoid unnecessary opposition to 
the change based on misunderstanding. 
Distributional Issues. One indisputable 
distributional effect of competitive bidding 
concerns the loss of “free”36 supplementary 
benefits by beneficiaries in areas where 
the government plan’s costs, and thus 
payments to private plans, currently are 
high. As noted earlier, this result is not 
necessarily undesirable. We know of no 
efficiency or fairness arguments that justify 
providing more government-financed 
benefits simply because some beneficiaries 
live in areas where risk-adjusted health 
care costs are higher. Medicare originally 
was envisioned as a national program with 
uniform entitlement benefits. Keeping that 
vision in mind, free supplementary benefits 
are a sure sign of something wrong with 
Medicare. Private plans are able to provide 
sometimes-substantial benefits for free 
because the government pays too much for 
the entitlement benefit.37
Obviously, we need a renewed agreement 
about what is already settled in statute—
that the federal government should be 
a prudent purchaser of the entitlement 
benefit. Prudent purchasing through 
competitive pricing has to mean eliminating 
free benefits. 
Nonetheless, the effects on beneficiaries of 
losing free supplementary benefits need to 
be taken seriously, because areas that “lose” 
under competitive bidding will resist it. If 
nothing else, this is an important political 
problem. Second, evidence exists that 
private plans enroll a disproportionate  
share of vulnerable beneficiaries. Thorpe 
and Atherly found that a plurality of 
Medicare beneficiaries with incomes 
between $10,000 and $20,000 were 
enrolled in Medicare HMOs, as opposed  
to the government plan.38 
The loss of free supplementary benefits 
for low-income beneficiaries could have 
important implications for both the 
Medicare program and state budgets. 
When low-income beneficiaries lose their 
free supplementary benefits, they may find 
it necessary to become dually enrolled 
in Medicaid and Medicare. Atherly and 
Dowd found that a $10 decrease in monthly 
government payments to private plans 
increases the probability of dual enrollment 
by 4 percentage points.39
When low-income beneficiaries become 
dually enrolled, states will be required 
to pay approximately 45 percent of these 
beneficiaries’ expenses for services covered 
by Medicaid (the average state match 
percentage). States would have a strong 
incentive to influence the beneficiary’s 
decision, and if permitted, might be willing 
to subsidize low-income beneficiaries who 
remain enrolled only in the government 
plan—for example, to replace the free 
benefits lost as a result of competitive 
bidding. Those subsidies might be 
coordinated with, or independent of, the 
Qualified Medicare Beneficiary and Special 
A Competitive Bidding Approach to Medicare Reform 17
Low Income Medicare Beneficiary subsidies 
currently in place. 
Requiring Beneficiaries to Choose among 
Competing Health Plans. It is important 
to remember that Medicare beneficiaries 
currently choose among competing health 
plans. Nonetheless, competitive bidding is 
designed to bring new price signals to the 
choice of health plans, communicating to 
beneficiaries when any plan costs more than 
the Part B premium because its bid is higher 
than the benchmark bid (for example, the 
second-lowest bid). Beneficiaries who wish 
to remain in a higher-cost plan will have to 
pay that difference. That is a good thing for 
the long-term solvency of Medicare, but it 
raises questions about whether the changes 
that elderly individuals will have to make 
are desirable. It will be useful to consider 
those questions.
Is the beneficiary’s choice between the 
government plan and private plans a public 
policy issue? That choice might be a public 
policy issue if there were systematic 
differences in quality between the 
government plan and private health plans, 
but there are not.40 The quality of private 
plans is variable, but so is the quality of the 
government plan. The best that can be said 
on this score is to follow the suggestion of 
others: in competitive bidding, it makes 
sense to maintain both intensive monitoring 
and transparency of public quality data in 
both private plans and the government plan. 
The first step is to have the government plan 
begin reporting the same quality measures 
now required of the private plans.
Can elders make this choice? A second 
point is obvious: while many elders are 
frail, it is ludicrous to imagine that most 
cannot change plans, as they routinely did 
when using private insurance during their 
working lives. This is the normal experience 
for anyone with employment-based 
insurance.41 And an elder whose current  
plan is more expensive will always have a 
no-cost option. 
Should Medicare provide resources for frail or 
incapacitated elders, especially those without 
family or other resources, to assist in their 
decision? Yes. It is worth noting the plight  
of these beneficiaries is not much addressed 
in current arrangements. But with 
competitive bidding, it would be more 
important to make community and other 
resources available to assist such elders.
Should the government give special 
consideration to areas where beneficiaries 
face large, abrupt changes under competitive 
bidding? Abrupt changes required to 
achieve worthy long-term goals may be 
inappropriate, given the reasonableness 
of settled beneficiary expectations and 
the time it takes to educate beneficiaries. 
Accordingly, introducing competitive 
bidding may have to include a transition  
to buffer large changes. That is easily done 
as a technical matter through ceilings on 
the rate of change, blended transitions, 
or other provisions. But there is a caveat, 
in the spirit of “no free lunch”: transition 
provisions can substantially reduce 
the savings from competitive bidding. 
A balance should be struck, and it is 
reasonable to worry that the political system 
will indefinitely postpone any reckoning 
with the need to change. 
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DYNAMIC SAVINGS FROM 
COMPETITIVE BIDDING
Shortly after the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act of 201042 was passed, 
Managed Care Magazine (2010), a trade 
journal, published an article that expressed 
a variety of opinions about how private 
plans will react to the payment cuts 
required by ACA.43 Some commentators 
predicted that private plans would cut 
benefits and raise premiums. But others, 
perhaps more perceptive, focused on how 
plans might navigate the cuts by changing 
the way they organize and deliver care. 
We refer to these changes as the “dynamic 
savings” from competitive bidding. The idea 
is that plans might adjust to the increased 
financial pressure of payment cuts by 
becoming more efficient over time. 
The notion of dynamic savings is 
important for proposals that would use 
competitive bidding to set the government’s 
contribution to premiums. Many people 
believe that such changes will promote 
the incentives for dynamic savings. For 
example, the Domenici-Rivlin Debt 
Reduction Task Force argued that making 
a fixed contribution would create incentives 
for Medicare plans to be more efficient.44
A Kaiser Family Foundation report 
summarized the central issue in the debate 
over dynamic savings as being “whether 
or not competition among plans would 
achieve these intended efficiencies or simply 
shift costs to beneficiaries is the heart of 
the debate about recreating Medicare as a 
premium support program.”45
Regrettably, little empirical evidence exists 
to support or refute the claim for dynamic 
savings. But analogies to past experience 
are promising. There are at least seven 
arguments why competitive bidding may 
create dynamic savings for either private 
health plans or the government plan. 
1. Competitive bidding has produced 
dynamic savings before. Coulam and 
coauthors showed that competitive 
bidding produced savings across widely 
varying parts of the Medicare benefit, 
in all instances that actual bids were 
received.46 For example, the Denver bids 
in the Medicare competitive pricing 
demonstration of the late 1990s were 
significantly lower than the cost of the 
market-norm benefit package for private 
plans in Denver. This evidence suggests 
that private plans will bid less than their 
current costs. However, the Denver 
program was canceled before it was 
possible to determine whether its plans 
actually reduced their costs to match the 
bids. Furthermore, this evidence does 
not show, either positively or negatively, 
whether bidding will reduce the rate of 
growth of costs. 
2. When Medicare beneficiaries in some 
market areas have to pay out-of-pocket 
premiums for the government plan, 
they may be so “shocked” by this new 
requirement that lose their loyalty to the 
government plan. Antos’s paper in this 
series (Plan Competition and Consumer 
Choice in Medicare: The Case for Premium 
Support) emphasizes this point. Private 
plans, sensing they can gain more 
enrollees by submitting low bids, may 
be more inclined to reduce their bids. 
We are 100 percent in favor of low bids, 
but, unless accompanied by appropriate 
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changes in plan behavior, they will not 
lead to an increase in efficiency. It will 
only decrease plans’ profits.
3. Under the current payment system, 
private plans bid against a known 
benchmark—the government plan’s 
cost. In a competitive bidding system, 
the benchmark is not known. This may 
create an incentive for plans to submit 
lower bids.47 As we described in point 
number 2, without other changes in plan 
behavior, this is a cut in profits rather 
than a gain in efficiency. However, if we 
are interested in getting plans to submit 
lower bids, the reason for the low bids 
may not matter.
4. Baker found cost-reducing spillovers into 
the government plan when the private 
Medicare sector as a whole grows.48 
5. Some studies show that firms in more-
competitive markets have lower costs.49 
However, the relevance of these findings 
is questionable because competitive 
bidding does not change Medicare’s 
market structure—instead, it changes 
how the government payment is set. 
6. The current tax on low bids encourages 
plans to submit high bids and provide 
tax-free amenities. While our proposal 
would eliminate the tax on low bids, 
this problem could be corrected without 
competitive bidding, just by eliminating 
the tax. 
7. Getting more people into private plans 
that accept a predetermined payment  
for all medical services may reduce the 
flow of cost-increasing technology over 
the long run, although that result is  
not certain. 
Although the evidence is lacking, these 
arguments point in the direction of dynamic 
efficiency—or at least toward lower bids—
not the other direction. The odds are that 
efficiency will improve, providing important 
support for competitive bidding. 
CONCLUSION
Medicare pays too much for the entitlement 
benefit. Part of Medicare reform is getting 
the price of the entitlement right, meaning 
the government should pay the efficient 
cost of producing coverage for beneficiaries 
in each area of the country. Competitive 
bidding is the only serious reform that 
promises to do that while preserving 
whatever entitlement is established. 
For so substantial a change, competitive 
bidding is remarkably well-tested and 
administratively modest. It will not be a 
big deal to implement. However, it will 
be a big deal to ensure that the bidding 
system runs smoothly and fairly. We have 
highlighted those areas throughout this 
paper, including:
•	 Leveling the playing field. Competitive 
bidding requires that the bids be as 
comparable as possible, so the full cost of 
the government plan must be allocated to 
the government plan’s bid.
We are 100 percent in favor of low bids, but, unless 
accompanied by appropriate changes in plan behavior, 
that will not lead to an increase in efficiency.
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•	 Transitional bidding rules. Even if 
competitive bidding is the right goal for 
the Medicare program, the transition to 
competitive bidding should be moderated 
for beneficiaries facing the largest 
changes in benefits and premiums. These 
adjustments are technically easy but can 
be very costly. 
•	 Risk adjustment. Given the technical 
problems of risk adjustment, it will be 
important to monitor plan behavior 
under competitive bidding, to provide 
some reassurance and enable technical 
refinement. This and other aspects of 
bidding urge more complete reporting of 
beneficiary-level data by plans.
•	 Protection of beneficiaries. Imperfect 
risk adjustment and other factors can 
give scope to plan-gaming that harms 
beneficiaries and undermines the 
purposes of bidding. A more transparent 
system of monitoring and reporting is 
needed to provide reassurance about 
what actually happens when bidding is 
implemented. Meanwhile, other aspects 
of the system (for example, possible 
beneficiary confusion with a new 
program) are ordinary concerns with a 
new reform but warrant close monitoring 
to enable early warning of problems.
Competitive bidding will save a substantial 
amount of money, the exact amount 
depending on the bidding rules ultimately 
selected and any transition rules adopted 
to moderate the pace of change for 
beneficiaries. Although bidding would save 
money by bringing more efficient prices 
to the entitlement benefit, it would leave 
unanswered whether the government can 
afford this or some other entitlement. But it 
is the right goal for setting prices. 
Whatever the political process deems 
appropriate for the entitlement, it is difficult 
to argue that the government should not 
be a prudent buyer of that benefit. A broad 
spectrum of political opinion currently 
agrees. It is the right time to reach agreement 
on the questions that divide opinion and 
begin making the necessary reforms.
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